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The links between ICTs, human rights and democratisation 
appear undeniable.1 The use of ICTS for democratic 
processes has grown and is increasingly powerful. 
From the Philippines in 2001, where text messages 
helped topple the government by directing 700,000 
demonstrators to the People’s Power Shrine to demand 
the resignation of President Estrada, to the use of mobiles 
by civil society to monitor national elections in Kenya 
(2007), Belarus (2006) and Ukraine (2004), as well as 
the Sudanese protesters in Cairo (2005-2006).2 Then, 
in early 2011 an unprecedented series of events took 
place leading to revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and mass 
civil movements for democracy in the Middle East and 
North African region. Many concluded that the advent 
of new ICTs had created new opportunities for advancing 
democracy, not only in states that are not democratic, but 
in all states, where diverse forms of democracy continue 
to evolve. 
But at the same time as the promises of the use of ICTs 
for freedom of expression, freedom of association and 
democratisation are being realised, new challenges have 
emerged.  This paper explores current issues and considers 
the implications for HRDs. The paper includes, as an 
appendix, a case study based on research in Malaysia by 
the Open Network Initiative Asia Gender Research Team 
October 2009, Gender Research Framework: Internet 
Censorship and Surveillance Practices A Gendered 
Perspective to Internet Censorship and Surveillance in 
Malaysia.3
The paper concludes with a call for a fresh look at the 
foundations of the IGF and human rights -- in light of 
the issues raised -- and for human rights to be the main 
theme of the IGF in 2012.
INTRODUCTION
1. Cowling, Leslie, “Theoretical Study- ICTS and Development 
in Africa” in Association for Progressive Communications 
ICTs for Democracy Information and Communication 
Technologies for the Enhancement of Democracy – 
with a Focus on Empowerment (Swedish International 
Development Agency, 2009) www.Sida.se
2. Ibid, at 31-32.
3. Gender Research Framework: Internet Censorship and 
Surveillance Practices A Gendered Perspective to Internet 
Censorship and Surveillance in Malaysia. Open Network 
Initiative Asia Gender Research Team October 2009, 
Association for Progressive Communication.
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Freedom of expression and freedom of 
association: a critical nexus
Which matters more: freedom of expression or freedom of 
association? Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights guarantee freedom of expression (FX) and 
association (FA). The placement of these alongside each 
other is no accident: the two freedoms are inextricably 
linked. The nexus between FX and FA is, in part, because 
of the link between individual rights and freedoms and 
their collective expression: the use of individual freedoms in 
collective democratic processes, public places, and human 
rights movements. For human rights defenders (HRDs) this 
link is critical and made clear in the Declaration on Human 
Rights Defenders 1998.4 
The Declaration affirms, for example, that for the purpose 
of promoting and protecting human rights everyone has 
the right individually, and in association with others, at 
the national and international levels, to meet or assemble 
peacefully, to form, join and participate, and communicate 
with NGOs. The Declaration also affirms that everyone has 
the right to seek, obtain, receive and hold information 
about all human rights, to develop and discuss ideas about 
human rights, and to make submissions to public bodies. 
Limitations on these rights and freedoms must comply 
with international human rights law. 
In the IGF and related processes there has been a general 
tendency to rely on these rights, rather than argue for the 
creation of new rights and freedoms. Horner points out, 
for example that by the end of the first phase of WSIS 
in 2003, civil society organisations general agreed “that 
advocacy for communications rights did not necessarily 
require the establishment of new legal standards…. Civil 
society groups also generally agreed that “communications 
rights” was a useful umbrella term encompassing the 
range of rights relevant to communications in modern 
society, including their positive dimensions.5 
But articulation of how these existing communication 
rights applied in relation to the internet was needed. 
The APC Charter of Internet Rights, for example, affirms 
the UDHR and defines its application in online contexts, 
including freedom from censorship, the right to online 
organising and protest, and freedom to express opinions 
and ideas when using the internet.6  The Charter of 
Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, developed 
by the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition, similarly 
includes the freedom to protest, freedom from censorship, 
the right to information, and the freedom of the media.7 
The IRPC Charter refers to the right to “form, join, meet 
or visit the website or network of an assembly, group, 
or association for any reason” and calls for access to 
assemblies and associations using ICTs not to be blocked 
or filtered.8
With the IGF foundations built upon freedom of expression 
and communication rights, it is timely to look at new and 
emerging issues affecting interference with these rights. 
This paper argues that interference is increasing, particularly 
by governments and on the grounds of protecting 
human rights of all citizens. This next section considers 
some current issues in relation to freedom of expression 




Access to the internet is a multi-faceted concept and 
includes access to infrastructure and content, including 
content creation and sharing.9  A strong human rights 
environment is needed if infrastructure regulation is to 
enable access, particularly in developing countries, where 
the links between freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and access are also multi-faceted. For example, 
as Jillian York notes:10 
While filtering and other means of restriction affect 
the ability to access content, access to the physical 
and technical infrastructure required to connect to the 
4. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly 9 December 1998). See in 
particular articles 5-7, 12-14, 17 and 18.
5. Lisa Horner, Information and Communication Rights in 
David Souter (ed) APC ICT Policy Handbook (2008), Chapter 
5 at 28.Initiative Asia Gender Research Team October 2009, 
Association for Progressive Communication.
6. APC Internet Rights Charter, Theme 2: Freedom of 
Expression and Association (APC, November 2006) www.
apc.org
7. The Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the 
Internet, Internet Rights and Principles Coalition (2010).
8. Ibid.
9. Frank La Rue “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression” (26 April 2011, A/HRC/17/27).
10. Jillian York, “Introduction” in Global Information Society 
Watch (APC and Hivos, 2011).
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internet can also be used by governments as a means 
of restricting the free flow of information and limiting 
individuals’ ability to associate and organise.  While 
in many cases, low internet penetration is a sign of 
economic or infrastructural challenges, it can also be 
an intentional strategy by governments attempting 
to restrict citizens from accessing information or 
developing civil society.  Though this strategy is best 
exemplified by Cuba and North Korea—where the 
majority of citizens are barred entirely from accessing 
the internet—dozens of countries with the capability 
to do so have slowed or stifled the infrastructural 
development necessary to expand access.
Evidence is also emerging about the impact on rights 
and freedoms from interference with access to mobile 
technology and user generated content (UGC).  Comninos 
points out that while UGC “can be a powerful tool in the 
hands of social movements campaigning for democracy 
and human rights” it is “the infrastructures through 
which this content flows [that] have proved to be areas of 
contestation between pro-democracy and pro-incumbent 
groups.”  This contested area is not one where civil 
society’s power is equal to that of governments. 
New forms of crack-downs on dissent are emerging for 
example, by inhibiting the flow of information during 
protests, as well as by using UGC to track down protesters 
and arrest, detain and harass them. Governments 
in the MENA region were able to take advantage of 
advanced internet filters to block content during the 
uprisings including internet blackouts, slowdowns and 
filtering. Online restrictions on freedoms of expression 
and association were linked with offline human rights 
violations with arrests, detentions and harassment of 
those involved in the creation and dissemination of UGC.11 
Such restrictions not only affect HRDs. They also limit the 
ability of others to know what is happening, gain access 
to knowledge and create their own content. 
New challenges are also emerging as governments move 
services online. For example, standards bodies are making 
decisions that directly affect human rights when they 
make decisions on the design of electronic voting systems, 
access to government information and the availability of 
government services online.12 Design decisions underlying 
such standards also structure technologies that create 
the informal conditions in which people can engage in 
the public sphere on line. Similarly, standards choices 
in relation to encryption can determine the extent of 




New research demonstrates that mobile technology is also 
influencing the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association. The mobile phone is transforming access 
to the internet, content creation, and communication 
in diverse ways in many parts of the world.14 But a new 
“mobile divide” looks likely to emerge in the next 3-5 
years since, as Southwood notes, in the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and most developing countries, 
the majority of mobile handsets are basic phones, with 
limited functionality.15 SMS remains a primary form of 
communication, but in general its use is also limited by 
low literacy levels. In comparison, over half of mobile 
phone users in developed countries are likely to have a 
smart phone in the next 3-5 years. 
In this area, too, the links between FX and FA are clear. 
Southwood concludes that the additional functionality 
of rich feature phones (such as those with limited 
functionality for internet access) and smart phones 
(essentially a small, hand held PC) has resulted in high 
levels of user generated content. Citizens can author 
their own media, take pictures of what is happening 
around them and post text accounts of events they are 
witnessing.16 This has had the effect of giving space to 
a diversity of voices and issues that historically may have 
been ignored.17 Again, the links between FX and FA 
11. Comninos, Goliath and the mouse: Twitter revolutions and 
cyber crackdowns (APC 2011) at 9.
12. Laura DeNardis, Open Standards: opening standards, 
opening human liberty, Global Information Society Watch 
2009 (Association for Progresssive Communication and 
Hivos, 2009) 31 at 32..
13. Laura DeNardis, Open Standards: opening standards, 
opening human liberty, Global Information Society Watch 
2009 (Association for Progresssive Communication and 
Hivos, 2009) 31 at 32..
14. Russell Southwood, Policy and regulatory issues in 
the mobile internet, (Association for Progressive 
Communications, May 2011). www.apc.org 
15. Ibid, at 1.
16. Ibid, at 2
17. Cowling, above n 1, at 2..
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appear, as Cowling says:18
The benefits from a rights perspective are clear. 
Hybrid media offer an opportunity to expand and 
enlarge the voice of marginalised people, and to 
raise issues and expose violations of human rights, 
on mainstream platforms. The possibility of debate 
effectively expands the public sphere, and holds the 
potential for enhanced democratic interaction.
The New Norm: interference with 
communication rights
Citizen journalism and crowdsourcing applications offer 
new ways to empower citizens and facilitate freedom 
of association and democratisation.19 The use of ICTs 
for human rights monitoring, documentation and 
democratic advocacy is growing, although it is not without 
challenges.20 Recent protests and uprisings in MENA were 
characterised as “Twitter revolutions” and “Facebook 
revolutions” due to the widespread use of UGC distributed 
over social networks by protestors, activists and supporters 
of protests as well as by those following events around 
the globe. Many have commented on the power of social 
media in the hands of protesters and activists, but how 
are states responding? 
Deibert21 and others argue that it is clear the balance of 
power has shifted and that new norms have emerged in 
internet and information control techniques.22 No longer 
do democratic governments shy away from stating they 
are actively pursuing internet regulation. Instead, such 
governments are actively promoting regulation, invoking 
their obligations as States to protect human rights – 
increasingly on the grounds of security, child pornography 
or prevention of criminal activity. Other governments are 
embracing the new technology and using it in new ways 
to infiltrate, carry out surveillance and disrupt the activities 
of HRDs moving to second and third generation forms of 
internet control technique which interfere with or violate 
human rights.23
Control of freedom of expression and access to content 
may have already emerged as a new norm. By 2010, for 
example, OpenNet Initiative estimated that a staggering 
half a billion internet users (or about 32%) experience 
some form of national-level content restriction. York notes 
that “even in states where access remains low—such as 
in Ethiopia, where internet penetration hovers around 
0.5%—governments fearing the democratising power 
of the internet are preemptively putting additional 
restrictions in place.  As of 2011, more than forty-five 
states have placed restrictions on online content.” Libya 
barred access for most citizens from February 2011.  Iran 
has announced plans to create an in-country intranet, 
signalling its intent to withdraw from the global internet. 
In the wake of the London riots in 2011, the British Prime 
Minster was quick to assert that control of access to the 
internet and social networking sites was a legitimate 
option for the British authorities to consider. In a statement 
in reply, the Chinese state-run news agency Xinhua 
stated: 24
“We may wonder why Western leaders, on the one 
hand, tend to indiscriminately accuse other nations 
of monitoring, but on the other take for granted their 
steps to monitor and control the Internet …For the 
benefit of the general public, proper Web-monitoring 
is legitimate and necessary.”
There are an increasing number of these examples. 
Pakistan, for instance, has recently moved to ban 
encryption of software (including email) with severe 
security and privacy implications for human rights activists 
as well as journalists.25 The Pakistan Telecommunications 
Authority (PTA) directive, issued on 21 July 2011, orders 
ISPs and mobile phone companies to implement the 
Monitoring & Reconciliation of International Telephone 
Traffic Regulations 2010, by prohibiting and reporting all 
18. Cowling, above n 1, at 26.
19. Lisa Horner, A human rights approach to the mobile 
internet, (Association for Progressive Communications, 
April 2011). www.apc.org 
20. Alex Comninos, Twitter revolutions and cyber-crackdowns: 
the use of user-generated content and social networking in 
the Arba Spring and beyond, (Association for Progressive 
Communications, June 2011) www.apc.org 
21. Deibert, R., Palfrey, J., Rohozinski, R. & Zittrain, J. (Eds.) 
(2011). Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, 
and Rule in Cyberspace. MIT Press.
22. Ibid, at 6.
23. Ibid
24. For critique see Rebecca MacKinnon, “Squelching social 
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users sending encrypted information over the internet. 
The effect of such a ban would be felt widely since 
encryption is used in Pakistan to provide secure banking 
and e-commerce, as well as to bypass the PTA’s regular 
blocking of websites. 
Government interference with SMS messaging for 
“security reasons” is also frequent: whether in the Kashmir 
region in India, Cameroon, Ethiopia, or Mozambique, 
and amidst post-election violence in Kenya. In some 
cases interference is on a massive scale such as in India 
where bulk messages services were banned for 10 days 
in Allahabad, effectively shutting down services to 36 
million users.26 
Government policy making remains varied with 
inconsistent and sometimes simply irrational policies. 
Southwood notes that some developing country 
governments have differentiated between controlling 
the use of SMS and the internet on the basis that one is 
a mass medium and the other is not: 27
For example, postpaid subscribers in Kashmir can 
use SMS but prepaid subscribers cannot. Cameroon’s 
government chose to close down Twitter by SMS for 
a period but not Twitter on a PC. Other governments 
have sought to control certain types of internet 
software (Facebook, Twitter) that are available on PC, 
mobile and tablet because they see them as politically 
threatening to their own survival.
Further pressure has been paced on freedom of 
association by government policies on registration to 
enable surveillance of internet use, including in public 
places. York, for example, notes that a number of 
countries, including South Korea, have attempted: 28
… to track users by requiring government 
identification to use certain websites or to enter 
cybercafés. Government-enabled or sponsored 
attacks on infrastructure or individual websites have 
become increasingly common.  And more recently, 
governments aware of the internet’s organising 
potential have taken to implementing “just-in-time” 
blocking – limiting access to sites during specific 
periods of election or protest, or worse, arresting 
bloggers and social media users or shutting down 
the internet entirely as has occurred in Egypt, Libya, 
and Syria.
Governments are also increasingly requiring the private 
sector, including internet intermediaries, to exercise 
gatekeeper functions at their direction. For example, 
demands by governments for social networking platform 
providers to regulate the political activities of members 
appear to be increasing. Comninos refers to Facebook 
policies resulting in the Facebook pages of political 
activists being shut down: 29 
 
The We are all Khaled Said Facebook page, which 
played an important role in the cyber-arena of 
the 25 January revolution in Egypt, was opened 
in June 2010 but was shortly afterwards closed 
down by Facebook because the user who opened 
the account El Shaheed was using a moniker 
rather than a real name. Whilst this should come 
as no surprise –Facebook makes it explicitly clear 
that the use of fake names or monikers is not 
allowed on the platform and are a violation of the 
terms of service– many have questioned whether 
Facebook closures of certain pages have political 
motivations. In the United Kingdom in April 2011 
a group of students from University College 
London, called UCL Occupation, protesting 
over fee increases and cuts to higher education 
funding, claimed that in 12 hours Facebook had 
deleted over 50 Facebook profiles of activists in 
the UK. In contrast, it appears that Facebook and 
Twitter have on the whole not interfered with the 
use of their platforms for protests in the MENA 
region. These examples however serve to remind 
activists that, at the end of the day, it is the social 
networking platforms or content platforms on 
which the content is hosted that have ultimate 
control over their online content.
 
In addition, some private companies are playing 
gatekeeper roles as either content producers or 
26. Southwood, above n 14, 5-7.
27. Southwood, above n 14, 16.
28. York, above n 10.
29. Comninos, above n 11, 12-13.
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distributors in relation to political content. For example, 
Apple initially banned the app of Pulitzer Prize-winning 
cartoonist Mark Fiore on the grounds that Apple’s terms 
and conditions limited material which “ridicules public 
figures” and in Apple’s reasonable judgment may be 
found objectionable, for example, material that may be 
considered obscene, pornographic or defamatory”.30 
Such private contractual terms seek to limit freedom of 
expression, yet may be more restrictive than limitations 
permitted under Articles 19 or 20 of the UDHR which 
restrict limits on, for example, parody and satire.  Concerns 
were also raised in 2011 about the use of location devices 
and possible risks to freedom of movement and to HRDs.
Private sector companies can also impose or be complicit 
in limits to free expression particularly when obliged to 
follow domestic law in foreign countries. In countries 
where restrictions to online content are the norm, this 
results in aiding government censorship.  York, for 
example, notes that: 31
Between 2006 and 2010, Google censored its search 
results at the behest of the Chinese government, 
while Microsoft continues to do so.  And several 
companies—including American companies Cisco and 
SmartFilter, and Canadian company Netsweeper—
allow their filtering software to be used by foreign 
governments.  These concerns also extend to 
platforms that host user-generated content.
York points out that there is also evidence that 
governments are restricting access from users outside 
of their countries using what is known as geolocational 
IP blocking.  “This tactic has a variety of uses, from 
media content hosts like Netflix and Hulu blocking users 
outside of the US in compliance with copyright schemes, 
to American companies blocking access to users in 
sanctioned countries like Syria and Iran.”32 
Social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, 
as well as being possible instruments of protest, can 
also render users vulnerable to state surveillance. For 
example, these platforms, when combined with facial 
recognition technology, have been used by security and 
intelligence agencies to identify and locate activists and 
protesters. Police in the United Kingdom were able to 
use this technique to quickly identify alleged offenders 
following the London riots and encouraged members of 
the public to identify and name individuals. Civil society 
groups expressed concern that British Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, blaming social media and websites for the 
London riots, indicated the government would “look at 
whether it would be right to stop people communicating 
via these websites and services when we know they are 
plotting violence, disorder and criminality”. 33  Other 
civil society groups subsequently called on government 
officials, who met with some private sector social media 
and communications companies in the light of the Prime 
Minister’s comments, to also meet with civil society groups 
and have open, transparent and democratic processes 
for any consideration of moves to restrict freedom of 
expression and association.34
Deibert also notes that a “third generation” of internet 
control or interference with access to information has 
also emerged. This is the active use of covert forms of 
surveillance and monitoring of HRDs. Comninos highlights 
this with examples of the use by governments of sock-
puppets (fake identities) and astro-turfing (fake grass roots 
organisations) to create pseudo movements, infiltrate 
legitimate organisations and conduct surveillance. 
Comninos highlights these strategies and tactics and calls 
on HRDs to be aware of these tactics, build capacity to 
detect and respond to them, encouraging documentation 
and monitoring so that new trends can be exposed and 
resistance strategies shared.
New forms of resistance 
 
Just as new forms of interference with FX and FA 
online and offline have emerged, so have new forms 
of resistance. In Kenya, for example, interference with 
the internet during post election violence in 2005, gave 
birth to the Ushahidi project which helped to track and 
map violent incidents in the country using both PCs 
and mobile phones. Disabled women have used the 
30. Southwood, above n 14, 8-9.
31. Ibid.
32. York, above n 10.
33. Association for Progressive Communications and GreenNet 
http://www.apc.org/en/news/london-riots-social-media-
does-not-cause-social-pr
34. Index on Censorship (and others) http://www.indexon 
censorship.org/2011/08/joint-letter-to-home-secretary-on-
social-media-blackouts/
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internet to overcome difficulties of mobility and access 
to find each other and form national disabled women’s 
networks in Bangladesh, Nepal and India.35 Linking online 
and offline activism, disabled women in Bangladesh’s 
National Council of Disabled Women, have formed 
human chains against police officers who do not register 
reports of crimes, and have succeeded in obtaining more 
prosecutions for crimes against all women. Sex workers in 
India and throughout South Asia have used technology to 
aid their efforts in organising and demand their voices be 
part of women’s human rights movements and democratic 
processes.  The use of ICTs for increasing marginalised 
voices in democratic spaces is growing.
Government suppression of access to the internet is being 
actively resisted by users and can have unintended effects 
or precisely the opposite effect of government intentions:
Hours after the internet had gone back up, 
Egyptian security forces arrested, detained and 
harassed bloggers and Facebook and Twitter 
users who had shared content or publicised 
and attended events, such as Wael Ghonim, 
head of marketing of Google Middle East and 
North Africa, who was detained for seven days. 
Following these events, a popular view on Tahrir 
Square reflected in UGC was that many protesters 
were going to stay in the square until either 
they were defeated and arrested or Mubarak 
stepped down. For many, this was not only out 
of conviction, but also because they were content 
creators themselves or had created footprints on 
social networks. Many were afraid that in light 
of the arrests, detentions and alleged beatings 
of content creators, they had themselves become 
victims and they imagined being arrested if they 
returned home. This case demonstrates that 
crackdowns on ICT will not necessarily serve to 
quell revolutions and can in fact stoke them. It 
also demonstrates the amount of danger and 
vulnerability that activists had exposed themselves 
to online.36
HRDs are not scurrying under their keyboards and many 
are continuing to demand and advocate for human rights. 
But while it is relatively easy for HRDs to get around 
filtering and content blocking, it is much more difficult to 
organise in this new environment.37 HRDs must be more 
engaged with their own personal security, monitoring 
privacy settings, conditions of use and when setting up 
new accounts, constantly monitoring changes in terms 
and conditions of use over time. Comninos emphasises 
having good processes for data back up and mirroring of 
content, the use of alternatives to Facebook, using https: 
and end to end encryption to minimise surveillance as 
well as anonymity tools, including proxies, VPNs, and 
TOR to protect the identity of content creators as well as 
circumventing internet filtering and censorship systems. 
Conclusion
 
This paper has considered the nexus between freedom of 
expression and freedom of association. The links between 
ICTs, human rights and democratisation are undeniable.38 
But these are also under increasing and significant threat, 
not only in states that are not democratic, but in all 
states, where the diverse forms of democracy continue 
to evolve.  Freedom of expression does not matter more 
than freedom of association – the two are inextricably 
linked and interdependent. ICTs are no substitute for the 
processes of communications and information sharing and 
organising – but they can strengthen these processes. For 
these effects to be sustainable we must be alert to the 
new challenges and the ever shifting contexts, both on 
line and offline, in which those processes are taking place. 
The increasing use of human rights arguments by States 
as the reason for controlling access to the internet (and 
the implications for freedom of expression, association 
and democratisation) demands responses from HRDs, 
policy makers and civil society. As Leslie Cowling states:
While new ICTs make human rights violations possible 
by states, corporations and individuals with fraudulent 
intent, these violations are not inherent and inevitable 
35. Geetanjali Misra Looking In, Looking Out: Starting the 
Count, Count Me In! Conference Paper, Creating Resources 
for Empowerment in Action, April 2011, Kathmandu, 
Nepal).
36. Comninos, above n 11, at 9.
37. Ibid.
38. Association for Progressive Communications ICTs for 
Democracy Information and Communication Technologies 
for the Enhancement of Democracy – with a Focus on 
Empowerment (Swedish International Development 
Agency, 2009, www.Sida.se)
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consequences of the technologies themselves. Rather, 
the new forms of human rights violations are the effect 
of (politically) expedient decisions by states and non-state 
actors to impact on ICT users in this way, and are similar 
in intent to violations experienced in traditional media. 
This makes the state vulnerable to countervailing actions 
and campaigns – such as the emerging internet rights 
campaigns – to bolster human rights in the information 
society, using international protocols and human rights 
instruments and policing mechanisms.
The implications for the foundations of the IGF, including 
communication rights, are profound. For these to be 
explored in multi-faceted ways and with multi-stakeholder 
perspectives and inputs, human rights should be the main 
theme of the IGF in 2012.
APC is an international network of civil society organisations founded in 
1990 dedicated to empowering and supporting people working for peace, 
human rights, development and protection of the environment, through the 
strategic use of information and communication technology (ICTs).
We work to build a world in which all people have easy, equal and affordable 
access to the creative potential of ICTs to improve their lives and create more 
democratic and egalitarian societies.
w w w . a p c . o r g  i n f o @ a p c . o r g
 
association for progressive communication
Internet and ICTs for social justice and development
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND DEMOCRACY:  




ISBN: 978-92-95096-37-0    
Creative Commons Licence: Attribution-NonCommercial ShareAlike 3.0 licence
Commissioned by the Association for Progressive 
Communications (APC) 
Conducted with support from the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
